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Wrongful Life: Legal and Medical
Aspects*
By CONSTANCE FRISBY FAIN**
INTRODUCTION
Innovative causes of action in tort law evolve when conflicts
develop between the established case law and the necessity of
reacting to emerging problems. One such action, "wrongful
life," has been met with a gie,,j deal of disapproval. Although
sometimes applied to other types of claims,1 ' "wrongful life" is
defined most commonly as an action "brought by the child's
* Copyright 1987 by Constance Frisby Fain.
** B.S. 1970, Cheyney University; J.D. 1974, Texas Southern University; LL.M.
1981, University of Pennsylvania. Associate Professor of Law, Texas Southern Univer-
sity, Thurgood Marshall School of Law.
Several types of wrongful life claims have been filed. One involved a suit by an
illegitimate child against his father for wrongfully causing the child's conception. See
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964). A second involved a suit by an illegitimate child against the legal guardian of
his incompetent mother for negligently allowing a sexual assault which resulted in the
child's birth. See Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343 (N.Y. 1966) (discussed infra at notes
31-34 and accompanying text). A third type involved a medical malpractice action where
a physician was sued for either failing to inform or incorrectly informing parents of the
possibility that their child would be born with mental or physical birth defects, removing
the parents' opportunity to avoid conception or consider an abortion. See Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967) (discussed infra at notes 35-38 and accompanying
text); Park v. Chessin, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), modified and aff'd,
400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. 1977) (discussed infra at notes 49-55 and accompanying text).
A fourth type involved a child born with Tay-Sachs disease suing medical testing
laboratories and a physician even though they had informed the parents of the possibility
that the child might be born with birth defects. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labora-
tories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (discussed infra at notes 79-90 and
accompanying text). Although the Curlender court allowed the child to recover against
the medical testing laboratory, it recognized the apprehension expressed by other courts
that, if wrongful life actions were recognized, nothing would prevent actions by children
against their parents for allowing them to be born. The court, however, found this fear
groundless. The court felt that, if parents made a conscious decision to proceed with a
pregnancy after being informed by a health care provider that the child would be born
handicapped, the parents would be answerable not in a wrongful life action, but for the
pain, suffering, and misery experienced by the child and no sound public policy should
protect the parents from liability. Id. at 488. For three basic categories of wrongful life
suits, see infra Section I.
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parents or by a guardian ad litem on the child's behalf ...
based upon the same negligence as the parents' cause of action
for 'wrongful birth.' "2 "Wrongful birth" actions, however,
constitute the breach of duty by a physician or other health care
provider to advise parents of the probability that their child will
be born genetically impaired. 3 Although many courts recognize
the tort of wrongful birth, 4 most courts refuse to accept wrongful
life actions.5
2 Note, Wrongful Life: New Cause of Action Recognized Based Upon Medical
Malpractice Theory, 62 NEB. L. REv. 175, 175-76 n.2 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Medical
Malpractice Theory].
For various definitions and other information regarding wrongful life actions, see
DeVries & Rifkin, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Wrongful Pregnancy: Judicial
Divergence in the Birth-Related Torts, 20 FORUM 207 (1985); Morrison, Torts Involving
the Unborn-A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLo R L. REv. 131 (1979); Reilly, A 'Wrongful
Life', 1982 RESDMENT & STAFF PHy SlCAN 71; Saltz, Better Off Never Born, 72 A.B.A.
J., Apr. 1, 1986, at 46; Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL
MED.. 63 (1984); Stoutamire, The Effect of Legalized Abortion on WrongfulLife Actions,
9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 137 (1981); Note, Wrongful Life, 19 J. FAM. L. 363 (1980-81);
Note, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic
Malpractice, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 477 (1982) [hereinafter Note, A Preference]; Note, A
Reassessment of "Wrongful Life" and "Wrongful Birth", 1980 Wis. L. REv. 782;
Comment, "Wrongful Life": Should The Cause of Action be Recognized?, 70 Ky. L.J.
163 (1981-82); Comment, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: Questions of Public Policy,
28 Loy. L. REv. 77 (1982); Comment, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort, 4 SPECIALTY
L. DIG: HEALTH CARE 5 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, A Misconceived Tort]; Comment,
Wrongful Life: The Child's Cause of Action for Negligent Genetic Counseling in Texas,
16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, The Child's Cause of Action];
Comment, Torts- Wrongful Life-Infqnt's Right to Sue for Negligent Genetic Coun-
seling, 48 TENN. L. Rsv. 493 (1981); Comment, Wrongful Life: The Right Not to be
Born, 54 Ttm. L. REv. 480 (1980) [hereinafter Comment, Wrongful Life].
I Note, Medical Practice Theory, supra note 2, at 175-76 n.2.
4 Many courts recognize wrongful birth actions and generally permit parents to
recover, during the child's minority, extraordinary costs of treatment and additional
medical or educational expenses attributable to the birth defect. See, e.g., Robak v.
United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309
(D.S.C. 1983); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d
315 (Idaho 1984); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (also compensated parents for mental anguish)
(discussed infra at notes 101-119 and accompanying text). See generally Turpin v. Sortini,
643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (discussed infra at notes 91-100 and accompanying text);
Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807
(N.J. 1978) (discussed infra at notes 56-61 and accompanying text); Jacob v. Theimer,
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wash.
1975) (discussed infra at notes 43-44 and accompanying text).
I See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (discussed infra at notes
62-63 and accompanying text); Moore v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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In recent years, birth-related legal claims, such as wrongful
life actions, have increased, a fact which can be attributed par-
tially to the accessibility of medical facts to patients, and par-
tially to prenatal and genetic testing. Amniocentesis,
ultrasonography, and related procedures used to detect fetal
development problems during the first three months of preg-
nancy have become commonplace. Therefore, if prenatal tests
reveal that a woman is carrying a defective fetus, she can make
a decision to terminate the pregnancy based on her constitutional
right of privacy.
6
This Article examines the wrongful life issue in terms of the
scope of the problem, its historical development, and an over-
view of this tort's medical aspects.
I. PROBLEM STATEMENT
To clearly understand the wrongful life issue, one must dis-
tinguish wrongful life from other labels that may be used syn-
onymously. Over the years, a great deal of confusion has existed
regarding the use of the term "wrongful life," with that label
being given to a variety of factual situations. 7 This confusion
has prompted one writer to recommend that the term be replaced
by the term "genetic malpractice." 8
Three basic classes of wrongful life actions have emerged.
First, the "stigmatized life" suit, "alleg[es] a stigmatized life
status-illegitimacy-as the result of the father's failure to marry
1981); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. App. 1981); Speck v. Finegold,
439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981) (affirmed on equally divided rate) (discussed infra at notes 73-
78 and accompanying text); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (discussed
infra at notes 146-166 and accompanying text); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872
(W. Va. 1985) (discussed infra at notes 167-175 and accompanying text); 233 N.W.2d
372; Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
' See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The United States Supreme Court,
declared that a fetus, regardless of the gestational age, is not a legal person under the
fourteenth amendment. Consequently, a woman and her physician held exclusive discre-
tion to determine whether to continue pregnancy during the first trimester. The court,
thereby, extended a woman's right to privacy to include her right to an abortion.
For various types of factual situations upon which wrongful life claims are
based, see supra note I.
See Note, Medical Malpractice Theory, supra note 2 (quoting Note, A Prefer-
ence, supra note 2, at 491).
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the mother before or after the child was born." 9 A second
category, the "unwanted life" suit, occurs when "a healthy but
unwanted child is born, due to a failure of contraception or
sterilization." 10 A third category, the "diminished life" suit, is
one in which "the child is born with a genetic defect which
could have been diagnosed by the physician, but was not, leading
the parents to an uninformed decision to carry the pregnancy
full term."" The "diminished life" suit, which raises some
intriguing questions regarding medical technology, is the primary
category for wrongful life actions. At the heart of wrongful life
litigation lie advances in medical knowledge which enhance the
physician's ability to detect problems with fetal development
through techniques such as amniocentesis and ultrasonography.
Advances in prenatal and genetic testing have even led to the
creation of the new specialty of genetic counseling.' 2
Wrongful life and wrongful birth causes of action arise out
of the same negligent conduct. In each, the plaintiffs allege that
the health care provider failed to inform (or incorrectly in-
formed) the mother of the risk of her child being born with
defects, and this constituted negligence which interfered with the
mother's opportunity to make decisions regarding procreation.
The plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants caused the birth
defects. Children's wrongful life actions are unique because the
child alleges that his or her life is wrong; that being born is an
injury and that the mother would have aborted had she been
aware the child could be defective.' 3 This distinguishes children's
claims from those of their parents and all other negligence
actions. Comparatively, the injury in the mother's wrongful birth
action is the deprivation of her right to make an informed
9 See Furrow, The Causes of "Wrongful Life" Suits: Ruminations on The Dif-
fusion of Medical Technologies, 1982 L. IVIED. & HALTH CARE 11, 11. See also Zepeda
v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (II1. App. Ct. 1963).
10 Furrow, supra note 9, at 11. See also Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich.
1971).
" See Furrow, supra note 9, at 11. See also Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J.
1984); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
2 Furrow, supra note 9, at 11. For information regarding genetic counseling,
amniocentesis, ultrasound, and recent advances in genetic testing, see notes 195-270 infra
and accompanying text.
"1 See infra notes 232-240 and accompanying text.
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decision regarding conception or abortion.1 4 Because the father's
claim is derivative from the mother's, his damages are financial
arising from his obligation to support the child. 5
A successful action for wrongful life requires proof of each
of the elements of negligence, i.e., duty, breach of duty, caus-
ation and damages. 16 The level of requisite proof of each element
varies, however, with the biggest obstacle for the plaintiff being
proof of damages.
To prove the element of duty, the plaintiff argues that the
existence of the physician-patient relationship creates a duty on
the part of the physician to the parents and child. Thus, the
child seeks compensation due to that special relationship and
the physician's subsequent obligation to warn of possible hered-
itary or congenital disorders. The foreseeability component of
duty extends to the unborn child. Generally, courts have not
had problems finding the duty element present.
17
To establish breach of duty, the plaintiff must show that the
medical care provider deviated from the applicable standard of
care. Failure to test for a defect in fetal development only
constitutes a breach when genetic counseling and prenatal testing
are indicated by a patient's situation. Evidence of increased risk
of conceiving or giving birth to a child who has a congenital or
hereditary disorder includes the advanced age of the mother,
certain racial backgrounds, exposure to particular drugs, and a
family history of offspring or relatives who have suffered from
genetic or birth defects. 8 Furthermore, a breach may occur
14 See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); 386 N.E.2d 807; Comment,
Wrongful Life, supra note 2.
" See Comment, A Misconceived Tort, supra note 2, at 9 n.6 (citing H. CLARK,
LAW OF Domssnc RmAIoNs § 6.3 (1968)).
11 See Note, Medical Malpractice Theory, supra note 2, at 183-95. See generally
W. PROSSER & W. KE ON, PROSSER & KaON ON TORTS § 130, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER].
" See Curlender v. Bio Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 479 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980); Harbeson v. Park-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Wash. 1983); Schmidt,
Wrongful Life, 250 J. A.M.A. 2209, 2209 (1983). For information regarding duty of
care generally, see PROSSER, supra note 16, §§ 28-36, at 160-234.
11 See Note, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim Which Conforms to the Traditional
Tort Framework, 20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 125, 139-40 (1978).
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through a failure to diagnose or misdiagnosis of a hereditary
defect in a couple's other children. 19
Next, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's breach of
duty was the cause in fact and proximate cause of the plaintiff's
damages. 20 This requires proof that the failure to test, failure to
warn, or misdiagnosis caused the parents either to forego an
abortion or to conceive, resulting in the birth of an impaired
child. 21 Some early cases held that the causation element required
that the physician cause the child's injury, but courts that rec-
ognize the wrongful life tort find that the failure to warn or test
caused the birth of a child with defects who otherwise would
not have been born or conceived. 22
Finally, the plaintiff must prove damages, the most contro-
versial of the four elements in wrongful life actions. For most
courts, determining damages in a wrongful life suit is difficult
because courts must attempt to return the injured person as
closely as feasible to the position he or she was in before the
tort occurred, but they feel that comparing the value of an
impaired life with nonexistence is an issue only for philosophers
and theologians? Recovery has been denied on this basis be-
cause public policy considerations mandate, as a matter of law,
that an impaired existence is always preferable to nonexistence.24
If general compensatory damages were allowed, the amount
would be highly uncertain because its determination would be
hampered by an inability to understand nonexistence? For this
reason, courts that have allowed recovery have restricted dam-
ages to special compensatory amounts, such as extraordinary
expenses for specialized equipment, teaching, and training. 26
19 See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982). For information regarding
breach of duty, see generally PROSSER, supra note 16, §§ 37-40, at 235-262.
20 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87; 386 N.E.2d at 811.
21 GIeitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 691-92 (N.J. 1967).
2 See Schmidt, supra note 17, at 2210. See 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89; 227 A.2d at
692. For information regarding cause in fact and proximate cause, see PROSSER, supra
note 16, §§ 41-45, at 263-321.
2' PROSSER, supra note 16, § 55, at 371.
227 A.2d at 692.
2 Schmidt, supra note 17, at 2210. See also 227 A.2d 689; 386 N.E.2d 807; 643
P.2d 954; Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.V.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); Harbeson v. Park-Davis, Inc.,
656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
2 Three state supreme courts have awarded special compensatory damages in
[Vol. 75
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II. A CASE LAW SURVEY
A rather complex liability problem has been created for
physicians, especially obstetricians, pediatricians, and family
practitioners, due to the advent of prenatal diagnosis of defective
fetal development and the rapid increase of clinics that specialize
in genetic counseling. Questions one may consider with respect
to wrongful life include: whether physicians have a duty to
identify and warn parents who may give birth to an impaired
child, what the extent of that duty is, and for what damages
can physicians be held liable when they have breached a duty to
warn. Some answers are suggested by the key judicial opinions
which follow. Because most courts have rejected wrongful life
claims, 27 those opinions that recognize wrongful life are empha-
sized.
The term "wrongful life" was not used in a court opinion
until 1963. Zepeda v. Zepedas involved a child who sued his
father to recover damages because the child was born out of
wedlock. 29 An Illinois appellate court denied recovery, holding
illegitimacy an unactionable injury. The court understood that
recognition of the plaintiff's claim would create a new tort of
wrongful life. Fearing that the legal implications of such an
action would be extensive and that the impact on society would
be great even if the new tort were restricted to illegitimate
claimants, the court preferred that the legislature declare the
state's policy. 0
wrongful life actions. See 643 P.2d at 955 (California) (denied recovery for general
damages but allowed for specialized teaching, training, and hearing equipment); 656
P.2d at 493 (Washington) (allowed recovery for emotion injury); 478 A.2d at 764 (New
Jersey) (allowed recovery for extraordinary medical expenses necessitated by child's
handicap).
27 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
Id. at 851.
Id. at 858. The court was more concerned with the nature of the wrongful life
action and the related suits which could be initiated than with suits by illegitimate
claimants. The court feared that persons born into the world under many adverse
conditions such as being born a certain race, with a hereditary defect, into a large and
poor family, or to parents with odious reputations would be encouraged to seek damages.
Id.
1986-87]
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In 1966, the New York Court of Appeals followed Zepeda,
in Williams v. State,3' by holding that the infant plaintiff, who
was born out of wedlock, had no right to recover from the state
of New York for negligent failure to prevent a sexual assault on
his mother which resulted in the plaintiff's birth. At the time of
the assault, the plaintiff's mother was confined in a state mental
institution. The court recognized the state's neglect but could
not find any "wrong" to a child born out of wedlock caused
by an institution permitting the mother to be violated.32 Observ-
ing that "[b]eing born under one set of circumstances rather
than another or to one pair of parents rather than another is
not a suable wrong that is cognizable in court, '33 the court,
citing Zepeda, held that the law provides no compensation for
being born illegitimate.
34
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,35 a significant case decided by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in 1967, involved a malpractice
action brought by a child and his parents against physicians for
negligently failing to inform the mother of the possibility that
her child would be born with birth defects. Consequently, the
mother failed to procure an abortion and the child was born
with serious defects. The court barred recovery on two grounds:
the impossibility of computing damages and public policy con-
siderations. With respect to damages, the court stated that be-
cause compensatory damages are measured by comparing the
plaintiff's condition if the defendant had not been negligent with
the plaintiff's condition after the negligence, a wrongful life
action requires comparison of an impaired existence with nonex-
istence, a comparison logically impossible to determine. Addi-
tionally, the court held that public policy considerations prohibit
any decision denying the value of life.
3 6
Three justices dissented, however, with one commenting that
the majority had failed to provide redress for a wrong which
3. 223 N.E.2d 343 (N.Y. 1966).
32 Id.
31 Id. at 344.
34Id.
31 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). Gleitman's holding was subsequently overruled by
Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984).
. 227 A.2d at 692-93.
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involved serious consequential injuries.3 7 Thus, nothing would
deter this type of professional misconduct, a situation neither
"just nor compatible with expanding principles of liability in
the field of torts." 38
In 1968, in Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital,39 a New
York lower court set aside a $100,000 wrongful life verdict
favoring the infant plaintiff. 40 The infant was born with congen-
ital disabilities because the mother contracted German measles
early in her pregnancy. The plaintiff alleged that her condition
was caused by one of the defendant hospital's staff physicians
negligently assuring the mother that she did not need a thera-
peutic abortion and by the hospital's failure to make a "reason-
able disclosure" that two of four physicians on its committee
believed she should have an abortion. 41 The court, referring to
Zepeda, Williams, and Gleitman, stated that "there is no remedy
for having been born under a handicap, whether physical or
psychological, when the alternative to being born in a handi-
capped condition is not to have been born at all." 42
In 1975, in Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital,43 the Wisconsin
court affirmed a judgment favoring the defendants, physician
and hospital, in an action brought by parents on behalf of their
child who was born with rubella syndrome. The parents also
had sued to recover damages they sustained due to the physi-
cian's failure to diagnose accurately the mother's illness and to
inquire about pregnancy. The court agreed with Gleitman, hold-
ing that, because there are no recognized legal standards by
which the alleged damages could be measured, no cause of action
could be recognized. 4
17 Id. at 703-04 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
" Id. See also Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Am., 215 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1965);
Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J.
1960).
"' 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968), modified and aff'd, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502
(N.Y. App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 48.
, Id. at 43. A therapeutic abortion has been defined as "the termination of a
pregnancy that was a serious threat to the health or life of the mother." See Dumer v.
St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Wis. 1975).
42 296 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
41 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
" Id. at 376.
1986-87]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In 1976, in Stills v. Gratton,45 a lower California court
considered a malpractice action by an infant and his mother.
The infant claimed damages as a result of an illegitimate birth
following a negligently performed abortion. 46 The court favored
the mother's right to recover all damages to which she was
entitled under ordinary tort principles. 47 The court, however,
based in part on Zepeda and Williams, denied recognition of
the infant's action based on the court's inability to measure
damages .4
8
In 1977, in Park v. Chessin,49 an intermediate New York
appellate court considered a wrongful life action brought by a
child's parents on behalf of their infant child to recover for "so-
called wrongful life and on their own behalf for medical ex-
penses, emotional distress and loss of services." 50 Park became
the first case to hold that an infant plaintiff had stated a cause
of action for wrongful life.5' The parents had consulted with the
defendants, before having a second child, to learn the likelihood
that future children would be born with polycystic kidney dis-
ease, a fatal hereditary condition. A previous child had been
born and had died five hours later from this disease, and the
plaintiffs had informed the defendants of this fact. In response
to the plaintiffs' inquiry, the defendants informed the parents
that the chances of conceiving a second child with the same
disorder were "practically nil,' '52 because the disease was not
hereditary.53 The second child, however, was born with the same
kidney disease and lived for only two and a half years.54 The
court, recognizing the causes of action of both the parents and
the child, held that the law must keep up with advances in
technology, social change, and economics. Parents have the right
4' 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). This was the only California case prior
to Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), to
consider the viability of the wrongful life cause of action.
46 127 Cal. Rptr. at 653-54.
4, Id. at 656.
4I Id. at 657-59.
41 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
Id. at 111.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 111.
53 Id.
N Id.
[V/ol. 75
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not to have a child by exercising their right to an abortion. The
court further declared that "ft]he breach of this right may also
be said to be tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be
born as a whole, functional human being."55
Park was modified in 1978 by the New York court as a
companion case to Becker v. Schwartz.5 6 In both cases, infants
born with congenital defects and their parents initiated wrongful
life actions against physicians. In Becker, the mother had been
under the care of obstetrics and gynecology specialists, and,
despite the mother's age (thirty-seven), the physicians neither
warned of the possibility of birth defects nor informed the
parents of the availability of the amniocentesis test 5 7 The court
held in each case that the infants were barred from recovery
because their complaints failed in two ways to state legally
cognizable causes of action. One flaw was lack of legally cog-
nizable injuries because of the absence of "precedent for rec-
ognition at the Appellate Division of 'the fundamental right of
a child to be born as a whole functional human being'. . .. "I'
A second flaw was that damages recoverable on behalf of the
infants were not ascertainable. Because the remedy available to
injured parties in negligence is intended to restore them to their
former position, i.e., to make them whole, the law is not equipped
to compare life in an impaired state with nonexistence.
5 9
Although the Becker court dismissed the infants' wrongful
life actions, it upheld the parents' claim in each case that the
physicians were negligent by failing to accurately inform the
parents of the risks involved in pregnancy (which resulted in the
Parks' decision to conceive and the Beckers' decision not to
procure an abortion). Becker held that the parents' complaints
stated legally cognizable causes of action for pecuniary damages
suffered through giving birth to infants with congenital disor-
ders, but for policy reasons rejected recovery for emotional harm
resulting from the birth of infants with impaired health.60 In
Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 807-0S.
Id. at 812 (quoting Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (N.Y. App. Div.
1977)).
" Id.
- Id. at 813.
1986-87]
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summary, the New York court decided to modify Becker by
dismissing the parents' complaint except for damages from the
cost of long-term institutional care of their child. The court also
modified Park by dismissing the parents' complaint except for
damages covering money expended for medical treatment and
care of the infant until her death. 61
In 1978, in Elliott v. Brown,62 the Alabama court followed
the lead of the New York and New Jersey courts and rejected
the wrongful life cause of action. In Elliott, an action was
brought on behalf of an infant against a physician for negligently
performing a vasectomy on the infant's father. Because of the
failed vasectomy, the infant was conceived and then born with
serious congenital defects. The court held that the infant had no
cause of action for wrongful life in absence of an allegation that
the physician's alleged preconception negligence caused the de-
fects. Furthermore, the court held that a person does not have
a legal right not to be born.
63
In 1978, in Gildner v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospi-
tal,6 a Pennsylvania federal district court relied on Gleitman
and refused to allow an infant suffering from Tay-Sachs disease
to recover for wrongful life. Each parent was a carrier of the
Tay-Sachs disease, but this was unknown because an amniocen-
tesis test was performed negligently. Although the court denied
the infant's wrongful life claim, it allowed the parents to recover.
Because proper testing combined with an abortion is the only
way to prevent the birth of a child with Tay-Sachs disease, the
court believed the public interest demanded proper performance
and interpretation of genetic testing. 5
In 1979, in Berman v. Allan,6 the New Jersey court partially
retreated from Gleitman. Berman relied substantially on the
61 Id. at 814.
361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978).
63 Id. at 547-48.
451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
Id. at 694-96.
404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979). The child was born with Down's syndrome, a genetic
defect commonly referred to as mongolism. The physician had not suggested an amni-
ocentesis test be given the mother, who was in her late thirties, an age that involves a
substantial risk of defective birth. Furthermore, no information was given the mother
about the risks of the child being born with this disease. Id. at 10.
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United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,67 holding
that women possess the constitutionally protected right, without
state intervention, to procure an abortion during the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy. 6 Some courts deem this abortion case relevant
in defining the scope of wrongful life actions. 69 In Berman, the
court's partial retreat benefitted the parents by permitting recov-
ery for their mental and emotional suffering. Lifetime support
for the child, however, was denied.
The court denied the child's right to recover due to the
difficulty of measuring damages and other public policy consid-
erations. Because even a severely handicapped child will experi-
ence such emotions as love, happiness, and pleasure, which were
deemed more valuable than the pain and suffering she may
endure, the court believed that life with or without a major
handicap is better than no life at all. Therefore, the court
concluded that the child had not suffered legally cognizable
damages by being born. 70 Justice Handler, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, stated that the majority opinion overruled
in part the Gleitman decision by recognizing the parents' right
to recover for mental and emotional suffering; a right this court
denied in 1967. 71 Furthermore, Justice Handler stated that im-
paired parenthood or parental capacity also should be included
as an element of the parents' damages; the child should be
compensated for breach of a duty of reasonable care by the
mother's physician owed directly to the child during gestation.
72
In 1979, in Speck v. Finegold,73 a lower Pennsylvania court
issued an exhaustive opinion in a malpractice action brought by
parents and their child. The child's wrongful life action was
based on being born with the serious crippling disease, neurofi-
bromatosis, of which his siblings also suffered. 74 The child's
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'I Id. at 164.
See, e.g., 165 Cal. Rptr. at 483; 478 A.2d at 759.
See 404 A.2d at 11-13.
71 Id. at 15.
,2 Id.
" 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981). See also
Suing for Being Born, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 1982, at 53. See generally BEHRMAN's
NEONATAL-PERINATAL MEDICINE: DISEASES OF THE FETUS AND INFANT (A. Fanaroff & R.
Martin 3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter BEHRmAN's] at 980-81, 987, 1051.
14 408 A.2d at 499.
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birth resulted from a negligently performed vasectomy on the
child's father and an unsuccessful abortion attempt by the phy-
sician on the motherY.7 Although the defendant's negligent treat-
ment of the mother and father was the proximate cause of the
child's birth with defects, the court denied the action, holding
that the child had failed to state a cause of action cognizable at
law.
76
The court noted two serious weaknesses in the child's wrong-
ful life claim. First, at that time there were no precedents in
appellate decisions holding that "a child has a fundamental right
to be born as a whole, functional human being."" The court
thought it a mystery whether it is better not to be born than to
be born with serious mental defects, believing it a subject better
left to philosophers and theologians. Second, because remedies
in negligence are designed to restore plaintiffs to the positions
they occupied before the defendant's negligence, the problem is
the improbability of placing the child in a state of nonexistence.
This requires a calculation of damages based on a comparison
between the child's impaired life and nonexistence.
78
The 1980 landmark case, Curlender v. Bio-Science Labora-
tories,'7 9 established the validity of wrongful-life suits in Califor-
nia. This case stimulated a great deal of controversy which
decreased significantly when the case was modified by the Cali-
fornia court's decision in Turpin v. Sortini.0 Curlender involved
an issue of first impression in California: "What remedy, if any,
is available in this state to a severely impaired child-genetically
defective-born as the result of defendants' negligence in con-
ducting certain genetic tests ... which, if properly done, would
have disclosed the high probability that the actual, catastrophic
result would occur." 81 The complaint alleged that the infant
plaintiff was born with Tay-Sachs disease following "incorrect
and inaccurate" information given by defendant laboratories to
11 Id. at 500.
76 Id. at 508.
7 Id.
79 Id.
" 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
0 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (overruling in part Curlender v. Bio-Science Labora-
tories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477).
11 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80.
[Vol. 75
8VRONGFUL LiFE
the plaintiff's parents concerning their status as carriers after
certain tests had been administered.8 Because the date of the
infant's birth was not alleged in the complaint, it is unclear
whether the parents relied upon the inaccurate test results and
went ahead to conceive the child or whether they relied upon
the results and failed to undergo an amniocentesis test and
consider termination of the pregnancy.83
In analyzing the case, the Curlender court reviewed the opin-
ions previously discussed and other opinions involving the his-
torical development of the wrongful life cause of action. The
court's holding was based on a survey of other courts' wrongful
birth damage awards designed to benefit the parents and on the
erosion of the argument concerning the impossibility of com-
puting wrongful life damages. The issues in controversy were
the right not to be born and the entitlement to damages for a
less than normal life. The court's decision to allow a wrongful
life claim had several bases. First, the court cited Roe v. Wade
4
as being very important in defining the bounds of wrongful life
actions." Second, the court recognized that medical laboratories
owe a duty to parents and unborn children to use ordinary care
in administering genetic testing.8 6 Third, the court believed that
recognition of the plaintiff's cause of action was consistent with
applicable principles of case and statutory law in California.
87
Fourth, because defendants ordinarily are liable for all conse-
quences of the damage inflicted, the court held the defendant
responsible for the pain and suffering the plaintiff would endure
during her limited life span and for special pecuniary loss due
to the plaintiff's impaired state.88 Finally, the court decided
punitive damages pursuant to state statutory law were appropri-
ate.-" Thus, the court felt that neither legal nor public policy
* 2 Id. at 480.
"Id.
' 410 U.S. 113.
165 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
" Id. 48S.
Id. 489.
Id. 489-90.
Id. at 490. The court stated that CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294 (,Vest Supp. 1986)
"allows ... damages 'where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, express or implied'; they are given 'for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant.' " Id.
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reasons existed for exempting a defendant, sued for wrongful
life, from liability for punitive damages.90
Turpin v. Sortini,9' a 1982 California case, was the first state
supreme court opinion to recognize an infant's wrongful life
action based on medical or professional malpractice. 92 The ques-
tion before the court was "whether a child born with an hered-
itary affliction may maintain a tort action against a medical care
provider who-before the child's conception-negligently failed
to advise the child's parents of the possibility of the hereditary
condition, depriving them of the opportunity to choose not to
conceive the child." 93 The plaintiff alleged that the infant's
pediatrician had advised her parents to take their first child,
Hope, to be tested for a possible hearing problem. Subsequently,
the pediatrician was incorrectly informed that Hope's hearing
was within normal limits. A second examination by other spe-
cialists revealed that Hope was totally deaf. Believing Hope's
hearing was normal, the parents conceived the plaintiff, Joy.
The plaintiff alleged that the parents would not have conceived
her had they known of Hope's hereditary deafness. When Joy
was born she suffered from the same hearing defect as her sister,
Hope. 94 The only cause of action before the court was brought
on Joy's behalf seeking:
(1) general damages for being "deprived of the fundamental
right of a child to be born as a whole, functional human being
without total deafness" and (2) special damages for the "ex-
traordinary expenses for specialized teaching, training and
hearing equipment" which she will incur during her lifetime
as a result of her hearing impairment. 95
The Turpin court found the plaintiff's injury was legally
cognizable, believing that the state's public policy did not, as a
matter of law, establish that life with defects is preferable to
90 Id.
91 643 P.2d 954.
9 Id. at 966. See Saltz, supra note 2, at 47.
91 643 P.2d at 955.
94 Id. at 956.
9S Id. The parents also brought actions seeking special damages for the support
and medical care of the child until the age of majority and special damages for emotional
distress sustained by caring for and raising a handicapped child. Id.
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nonexistence under all circumstances. Furthermore, negligent di-
agnosis of a hereditary ailment deprives parents of information
needed to help them decide if it is best for a child to be born
handicapped or not to be born at all. 96
The Turpin court rejected the Curlender analysis by limiting
the plaintiff's wrongful life recovery to special damages. The
court rejected recovery of general damages for two reasons.
First, the court could not determine whether the child had suf-
fered an injury by being born deaf, rather than not being born
at all. Second, even if an injury was perceived, the court believed
it impossible to assess general damages in a fair, unspeculative
manner. 97 The court, however, did allow the infant to recover
special damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary to treat
the hereditary defect. 98 The court stated that monetary compen-
sation would not adequately compensate the child for losing the
opportunity not to be born; but because special damages to
cover specialized training, teaching, and hearing equipment needed
during plaintiff's lifetime are readily ascertainable and are com-
monly awarded in professional malpractice cases, this type of
award was considered just.99 Thus, Turpin eliminated an infant's
right, as permitted in Curlender, to recover general damages for
physical and mental pain and suffering. 100
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,101 a 1983 Washington case,
was the second state supreme court case to recognize a cause of
action for wrongful life. Harbeson involved two infant plaintiffs
who were diagnosed as suffering from "fetal hydantoin syn-
',I d. at 962-63. See also Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir.
1981); 404 A.2d at 14; Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975).
643 P.2d at 963.
Id. at 965-66.
' Id. at 964-65.
Although the Curlender court recognized a child's right to recover damages for
wrongful life, the damages were subject to certain limitations due to the nature of the
cause of action. The court said the infant plaintiff's right to damages must be based on
her mental and physical condition at birth and her anticipated condition during the
predicted life span of only four years as alleged in the complaint. Damages also included
special pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired condition of the plaintiff. Punitive
damages, as requested in the complaint, were also justified. 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
1,1 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
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drome."102 After suffering a grand mal seizure, Ms. Harbeson,
the infants' mother, was instructed by physicians to take Dilan-
tin, an anticonvulsant drug. Ms. Harbeson was pregnant while
taking the medication, but the child she carried was born healthy.
After moving, Ms. Harbeson's treatment for epilepsy was con-
tinued. During the next eight months, the Harbesons informed
three physicians that they were considering having more children
and requested information on the risks of taking Dilantin during
pregnancy. Although each physician informed them that the drug
could cause cleft palate'0 3 and temporary hirsutism, °4 no litera-
ture searches were conducted nor were consultations with other
sources for specific information regarding the relationship be-
tween Dilantin and birth defects pursued. Relying on the phy-
sicians' assurances, Ms. Harbeson twice became pregnant and
gave birth. She continued to take Dilantin throughout both
pregnancies. The Harbesons would not have conceived other
children had they been informed of the potential birth defects
associated with the use of Dilantin during pregnancy. 05
With respect to the wrongful life issue, the Washington court
held that an action could be maintained for the children to
recover the extraordinary expenses to be incurred during their
lifetime due to their birth defects.' °0 The court agreed with
Turpin10 7 that it would be unusual and unreasonable to allow
the parents and not the child to recover for the child's own
medical bills. Of course, the two children's recoveries were lim-
ited to the medical costs incurred during their majority if the
parents recovered such costs for the children's minority in a
wrongful birth action. 0 8
102 Id. at 486. This condition is characterized by "mild to moderate growth defi-
ciencies, mild to moderate developmental retardation, wide-set eyes, lateral ptosis (droop-
ing eyelids), hypoplasia of the fingers, small nails, low-set hairline, broad nasal bridge,
and other physical and developmental defects." Id.
103 A cleft palate is "a congenital fissure in the median line of the palate, often
associated with harelip." STEDMN'S ME cAL DICONARY 910 (2d ed. 1972).
- Hirsutism is the "presence of excessive bodily and facial hair; especially in
women." Id. at 579.
lOS 656 P.2d at 486.
1 Id. at 495.
107 643 P.2d 954.
"OS 656 P.2d at 495. The court added that the necessity for medical care and other
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The Harbeson court based its holding on the four traditional
elements of a negligence claim: duty, breach of duty, causation,
and injury. One potential problem with duty is that while health
care providers are liable only to persons foreseeably endangered
by their conduct, the alleged negligence always occurs before the
child is born and often before conception.,09 Because the parents
in Harbeson informed the defendants of their plans to have
more children, future children were foreseeably endangered by
the defendants' unreasonable failure to determine the danger of
prescribing Dilantin to control the mother's seizures.'10 The court
believed the mother's physicians owed a duty to the unconceived
children, holding that "a duty may extend to persons not yet
conceived at the time of a negligent act or omission ... limited
... by the element of foreseeability."' Breach of duty is the
failure to comply with the appropriate standard of care appli-
cable in medical malpractice cases.
11 2
The court next addressed causation stating that the issue in
a wrongful life action is whether "[b]ut for the physician's
negligence, the parents would have avoided conception, or aborted
the pregnancy, and the child would not have existed."'1 3 If this
test is satisfied, the defendant's action is deemed the cause in
fact of the plaintiff's injury. Proximate cause is the second
component of causation. The court was not convinced by a
proximate cause argument advanced in some early cases ' 4 which
special expenses do not "miraculously" cease upon the child's attaining of majority.
Often, these expenses fall on the child's parents or the state. Rather than permitting
this, the court preferred to recognize the wrongful life action. Thus, the onus of those
expenses should be placed on the party whose negligence proximately caused the child's
birth, which resulted in the continuous necessity for special training and medical care.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 496.
' Id. at 495. See also Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096 (Wash. 1976).
12 656 P.2d at 496. Generally, "professional persons. . ., and those who undertake
any work calling for special skill, are required not only to exercise reasonable care in
what they do, but also to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability."
PROSSER, supra note 16, § 32, at 185. Specifically, a "doctor must have and use the
knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profes-
sion in good standing; and a doctor will be liable if harm results because he does not
have them." Id. at 187.
"1 656 P.2d at 497 (citing Comment, Wrongful Life, supra note 2 at 491).
14 Id. (citing 227 A.2d 689).
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alleged that the child's defect was not caused by the physician's
negligence but by the physician's failure to reveal the presence
of the defect. The Harbeson court rejected this argument and
instead emphasized the closeness of the causal connection be-
tween the physicians' negligence, the children's births, their af-
fliction with fetal hydantoin syndrome, and the resulting unusual
costs related to their defects. 15
The final element in a wrongful life cause of action, injury,
has engendered the most controversy." 6 The Harbeson court
agreed with the court in Berman"7 that mortals, whether judges
or jurors, cannot compare the value of an impaired life with
nonexistence, but did not find this difficulty sufficient to pro-
hibit a wrongful life cause of action. Although general damages
cannot be calculated with the "reasonable certainty" required
under Washington law, 8 damages for extraordinary expenses,
such as medical care and special training, can be computed.
Finally, the court disagreed with the Berman court's belief that
requiring a negligent defendant to compensate a child for the
costs of health care is "a disavowal of the sanctity of human
life."" 9
New Jersey became the third state to recognize a cause of
action for wrongful life when, in 1984, the New Jersey court
decided Procanik v. Cillo.120 Procanik involved a minor who
sought compensation from physicians because he was born with
congenital defects and would suffer a damaged or diminished
childhood. The minor's parents sought compensatory damages
to cover mental anguish and extraordinary medical costs related
to the congenital defects. The minor alleged that the defendant
physicians had breached a duty to him by failing to discover
that his mother had contracted German measles during the initial
trimester of gestation.' 2 ' Consequently, the minor was born with
"' Id.
116 See, e.g., 404 A.2d 8; 227 A.2d at 692.
'1 404 A.2d 8.
1 656 P.2d at 496 (quoting Dyal v. Fire Companies Adj. Bur., Inc., 161 P.2d 321,
324 (Wash. 1945)).
ji 656 P.2d at 497.
'2 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984).
121 Id. at 757.
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congenital rubella syndrome.'2 On the theory that his parents
negligently were divested of their option of terminating the preg-
nancy, the minor sought both general damages for pain and
suffering and for his parents' impaired ability to cope with his
condition and special damages attributable to the extraordinary
costs for health-related care.' 23
Procanik represents the New Jersey court's reconsideration
of a minor's right to recover general and special damages which
it had denied in Gleitman'24 and Berman.121 The Procanik court
found that the defendant physicians owed a duty to the minor
plaintiff when treating the mother. The court assumed that the
physicians breached that duty, thus depriving the minor's parents
of the option of terminating the pregnancy. 2 6 Although the New
Jersey court had recognized a breach of duty, policy considera-
tions previously had caused it to reject the wrongful life action.
This prior rejection had been based mainly on the plaintiffs'
assertions that the children should not have been born, not that
the children should have been born unimpaired. 127 Previously, in
Gleitman and Berman, this court felt that the minor had not
suffered any damage cognizable at law by being born and that
life, even though burdened, is better than nonexistence.
128
The Procanik court pointed out that dissenting judges in
Gleitman and Berman had urged recognition of wrongful life
claims because they felt a wrong had been committed. 2 9 In
Gleitman, Justice Jacobs stated that a reasonable measure of
compensation to relieve the plaintiff's financial burdens could
be afforded. 30 Although finding the plaintiff's emotional distress
claim could not be computed, Justice Jacobs felt the medical
and maintenance costs were capable of measurement.' 3' The
in The child suffered from multiple congenital defects comprised of eye lesions,
heart disorder, and hearing problems. Id. at 758.
"I Id. at 757.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
' See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
478 A.2d at 760.
117 See, e.g., 404 A.2d 8; 227 A.2d 689.
11- See supra text accompanying notes 35-38 and 66-70.
' 478 A.2d at 761.
227 A.2d at 703-06 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
"5 Id.
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court recognized that similarly, in Berman, Justice Handler sup-
ported recognition of the minor's claim for damages based on
the implication "that damages would be appropriate if they were
measurable by acceptable standards". 132 Therefore, "if the meas-
ure of damages were the only concern,' ' 33 courts could develop
a remedy to compensate minor plaintiffs for their injuries even
if recovery was only partial. 134
The Procanik court recognized that the injured child, as well
as the parents, feels the financial impact of extraordinary med-
ical care. Furthermore, the financial burden may affect the
injured child's siblings by reducing the money available for food,
clothing, and college education for the other children. 3 Thus,
recovery by either the parents or the child of damages for
extraordinary medical expenses "is consistent with the principle
that the doctor's negligence affects the entire family.1 ' 36
The Procanik court felt that the rationality of allowing par-
ents to recover extraordinary medical care expenses incurred by
an impaired child outweighed the unfair result of denying the
child's right to recover those damages. The child's right to
recover for his injuries should not depend on the parent's right
to sue, which in Procanik, was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. The minor plaintiff need not forego medical treatment for
her condition, because the expenses are reasonably certain, easily
computed, and of a type determined by judges and juries on a
daily basis.137 Thus, the court held "a child or his parents may
"1 478 A.2d at 761 (citing Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421); 404 A.2d at 15-21
(Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133 Id.
1" Id.
131 Id. at 762.
'3 Id. (citing 227 A.2d at 704 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)):
And while logical objection may be advanced to the child's standing and
injury, logic is not the determinative factor and should not be permitted
to obscure that he has to bear the frightful weight of his abnormality
throughout life, and that such compensation as is received from the defend-
ants ... should be dedicated primarily to [the child's] care and the less-
ening of his difficulties. Indeed, if this were suitably provided for in the
ultimate judgment, the technical presence or absence of the child as an
additional party plaintiff would have little significance.
Id. (quoting 227 A.2d at 704 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)).
137 Id.
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recover special damages for extraordinary medical expenses in-
curred during infancy, and ... the infant may recover those
expenses during his majority.""13
The court explained that its decision to allow recovery for
extraordinary medical expenses was based on the needs of the
living in bearing the burden of their condition, not on a belief
that nonexistence is preferable to an impaired life. The court
rejected the minor's claim for general damages for pain and
suffering because the minor plaintiff "never had a chance of
being born as a normal, healthy child. ' 139 His only option was
nonexistence or a handicapped life. Although the proximate
cause of the minor's birth was the defendant physician's negli-
gence, the minor's congenital rubella syndrome was not engen-
dered by the physician's negligence. In brief, there is no rational
way to compare pain and suffering with nothingness because of
the capricious and illogical nature of the claim. 140
The Procanik court continued its assessment of wrongful life
by maintaining that logic, equity, foreseeability, and prevention
of prospective tortious conduct are inherent in tort law's func-
tion of remunerating claimants who have been damaged or im-
paired. Thus, "it is too speculative to permit an infant plaintiff
to recover for emotional distress ... that plaintiff claims he
would be better off if he had not been born. Such a claim would
stir the passions of jurors about the nature and value of life,
the fear of nonexistence, and about abortion.' ' 1
41
Regarding the minor's claim for diminished childhood, the
court encountered additional difficulty and found such an as-
sessment even more debatable. An impaired childhood claim
requires evidence that the physician's failure to act reasonably
divested the parents of information regarding the state of the
fetus, which in turn eliminates their abortion option. The par-
ents' resulting failure to anticipate the birth of an impaired
infant engenders mental distress. Consequently, the plaintiff al-
leged that a diminished childhood would be experienced due to
Id.
Id. at 763.
I' /d.
14X Id.
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the lessened ability of the parents to love, show concern, and
tend to the infant's needs. 142
The court refused to recognize the plaintiff child's claim for
impaired childhood for several reasons. First, the parents would
have used the information regarding the fetus' condition to
terminate the pregnancy instead of to prepare for the birth of
an impaired child. Second, the child's and the parents' harms
may not be easily separated. Finally, the court indicated that
"the award of extraordinary medical costs to the child or the
parents when combined with the right of the parents to assert a
claim for their own emotional distress, comes closer to filling
the dual objectives of the tort system: the compensation of
injured persons and the deterrence of future wrongful con-
duct."1 43
Hence, the New Jersey court's decision in Procanik to award
special damages only to the plaintiff child to cover expenses for
extraordinary medical care was consistent with the California
court in Turpin v. Sortini'44 and the Washington court in Harbe-
son v. Parke-Davis.145
In accordance with the majority of courts, the Texas court,
in the 1984 decision of Nelson v. Krusen,'146 refused to recognize
the controversial cause of action for wrongful life. Nelson in-
volved an action by parents on behalf of their child for medical
care costs, pain, and suffering. The plaintiff/parents previously
had given birth to a child afflicted with Duchenne Muscular
Dystrophy; so after discovering that Ms. Nelson was pregnant,
they consulted the defendant, Dr. Krusen, to determine if Ms.
Nelson was a genetic carrier of the disease. 47 Dr. Krusen con-
ducted tests and an examination of Ms. Nelson on three separate
occasions with all results found normal.148 Based on a consul-
142 Id. at 763-64.
141 Id. at 764.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 106-108.
" 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984). See also Comment, The Child's Cause of Action,
supra note 2.
147 See 678 S.W.2d at 919-20, 924.
- An examination revealed pregnancy, normal muscle test and flexes, normal
laboratory test of Creatine Phosphokinase ("Enzyme present in skeletal and cardiac
muscle and the brain"), and normal electromyogram ("A graphic record of the con-
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tation with Dr. Krusen, the parents decided not to have the
pregnancy terminated, the minor plaintiff was born, and a sub-
sequent examination by a pediatric neurology specialist revealed
that the child suffered from Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy.
The complaint alleged that Dr. Krusen was negligent in ad-
vising Ms. Nelson of her risk of having a child afflicted with
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy by assuring her that she was "no
more likely than any other woman to have a child afflicted by
the disease. 149 The parents asserted that Dr. Krusen's advice
caused their decision not to procure an abortion. In the alter-
native, the plaintiffs alleged that defendant Baylor University
Medical Center negligently conducted or reported the tests, re-
sulting in Dr. Krusen receiving inaccurate results, causing plain-
tiffs to receive erroneous advice.150
The Texas court rejected the minor's wrongful life cause of
action noting two general, but fundamental, reasons why the
majority of states have declined to embrace the tort.Y First,
courts have been reluctant to allow wrongful life plaintiffs to
collect compensation because they are alive. At the crux of this
disposition is the "high value which the law and mankind has
[sic] placed on human life, rather than its absence.' 5 2 Second,
because in awarding compensation, the court is required to
balance any exceptional benefits inuring to the plaintiff from
the negligence, 53 a wrongful life cause of action entails weighing
traction of a muscle as a result of electrical stimulation"). See Nelson v. Krusen, 635
S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY, at
396, 527 (C.L. Thomas ed. 1985) [hereinafter MEDICAL DIcTIoNARY].
678 S.W.2d at 919.
Id. The gravamen of the minor plaintiff's complaint was that he never would
have been born if his parents had been informed of the possibility he would be born
with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, not that Dr. Krusen caused the defect. Thus, the
breach of duty by the physician was the proximate cause of the child's birth and his
having to live in an impaired condition. See id. at 924.
' See id. at 924-25. See also supra text accompanying notes 28-145.
1 678 S.W.2d at 924 (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812).
' 678 S.W.2d at 924 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979)). See
also Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) reh'g denied, 1982
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979)):
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or
to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the
interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred
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existence versus nonexistence, "a calculation that cannot ration-
ally be made.' '154 As stated in Gleitman, "ultimately, the infant's
complaint is that he would be better off not to have been born.
Man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness, cannot pos-
sibly know whether this is so.' ' 55
In justifying its objection to the wrongful life claim, the
Texas court considered the opinions in Turpin, 56 Harbeson,157
and Procanik,158 in which the children were allowed to recover
special damages. The Texas court did not believe that the prob-
lem was addressed so summarily. 59 The court emphasized that
claimants may only be restored to their conditions prior to the
tortfeasor's unreasonable conduct that caused the harm, a rule
which mandates contrasting the child's status with an impaired
life versus no life at all.160
Clearly, the Texas court did not agree that damages can be
restricted in the manner endeavored by the California, Washing-
ton, and New Jersey courts. The court noted the statement in
Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics and Gynecology'6' that
"[t]he special damages that are claimed cannot be considered in
a vacuum separate from the reality that, but for the alleged
negligence, plaintiff would not exist.' 1 62
The Nelson court concluded that its rationale not to recog-
nize wrongful life actions in Texas was not premised on the
complexities inherent in calculating damages, because it is well
established in Texas that inaccurate or ambiguous damage esti-
mations do not operate as a barrier to compensation. 63 Rather,
is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
Hickman involved parents' medical malpractice suit seeking damages for the cost of
raising an unplanned child whose birth resulted from the alleged negligent performance
of a tubal ligation on the mother.
4 678 S.W.2d at 924 (citing Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d at 376).
"I Id. (citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d at 711 (Weintraub, C.J., concurring
and dissenting)).
356 643 P.2d 954. See supra text accompanying notes 91-100.
, 656 P.2d 483. See supra text accompanying notes 101-119.
"' 478 A.2d 755. See supra text accompanying notes 120-143.
11 678 S.W.2d at 924-25.
,0 Id. at 925.
16 332 N.W.2d 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
162 678 S.W.2d at 925 (quoting 332 N.W.2d at 435).
,63 Id. (citing Hindman v. Texas Lime Co., 305 S.W.2d 947, 953 (Tex. 1947);
Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 1099 (Tex. 1938)).
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the court noted, wrongful life cases present the issue of whether
there has even been any damage sustained at all. 64 Moreover,
the court stated that such a determination is 'a mystery more
properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians.
1 65
Texas, like many other states, based its rejection of wrongful
life actions on the difficulty of resolving the damage issue, the
benefits rule, and public policy arguments emphasizing the sanct-
ity of human life. 66
The West Virginia court held in a 1985 consolidated opinion,
in James G. v. Caserta,67 that a wrongful life cause of action
does not exist in West Virginia in the absence of a statute giving
rise to such a claim.16 8 One case involved parents who brought
a claim for wrongful pregnancy due to an alleged negligently
performed tubal ligation, which resulted in the conception and
birth of a healthy child. 69 The second case involved parents and
their child who sought to recover damages for wrongful birth
and wrongful life, respectively. They claimed that their physician
negligently failed to perform an amniocentesis test on the wife
which would have revealed that the child would be born with a
birth defect.' 7
The issue of the existence of a wrongful life cause of action
was one of first impression in West Virginia.' 71 The court did
not feel the wrongful life claim could withstand a rational tort
theory analysis despite the factual relationship to the parents'
wrongful birth claim. 7 2 In the wrongful birth claim, "liability
Id4 Id.
Id. (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812).
Id. at 924-25.
", 332 S.E.2d 872 (V.Va: 1985).
Id. at 881.
", Id. at 874.
Id.
"' The court noted that the wrongful life and wrongful birth actions had:
evolved as a result of the increased ability of medical science to determine
the possibility of genetic defects which can cause substantial birth defects.
With the increased knowledge in this field of genetic counseling means that
there is the concomitant recognition that the ordinary standard of care
may require appropriate tests and counseling with parents who are more
likely to bear children with birth defects.
Id. at 879.
172 Id. at 880 n.17.
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rests on the physician's failure to initially diagnose the birth
defect. 17 3 According to the court, "this duty to inform does
not extend to the unborn child, as it is the parents' decision to
risk conception or to terminate the pregnancy."1 74 Thus, the
child's wrongful life claim was rejected because the physician
owed no legal duty to the unborn child, but only to the parents.
Consequently, the court declined to address the damage issue.
7 5
In 1985, the North Carolina court reversed a lower court
opinion and refused to allow a child born with Down's Syn-
drome to be compensated under the wrongful life theory. Az-
zolino v. Dingfelder76 involved a doctor and nurse who were
allegedly negligent in failing to advise the child's parents about
the possibility of performing an amniocentesis test and of genetic
counseling. 77 The court disagreed with the court of appeals
opinion that no life may be preferable to life burdened with
extreme weakening disorders. 78 Although the court appreciated
the interest and consideration demonstrated by the courts who
have recognized wrongful life actions, it felt compelled to reject
such actions as not being judiciable in North Carolina.
17 9
The court based its holding on several reasons. First, follow-
ing Becker,8 0 the court agreed that the issue of existence versus
nonexistence is an enigma to be resolved by those who are versed
in the nature of God and religious truth, because the law lacks
the capability to settle the matter considering the importance of
human life in society. '8 ' Second, the court feared the implications
of embracing the wrongful life theory would be "staggering,"'
8 s2
especially in view of related concerns such as paying a claim
171 Id. at 881.
174 Id.
171 Id. The court did recognize that many courts rejected wrongful life actions due
to the difficulty of computing damages.
176 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985).
'" Id. at 530.
171 Id. at 531 (citing Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 322 S.E.2d 567, 576 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984)).
179 Id. at 532-33.
,,o Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 ("Whether it is better never to have been
born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more
properly left to the philosophers and the theologians."). Id. at 812.
1 337 S.E.2d at 533 (citing Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812).
Id. at 533 (citing Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 821).
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"for a less than perfect birth.' 18 3 Third, the court held that the
law is not prepared to make a comparative estimate between an
impaired existence and no life, believing an appropriate formula
to compute the claimant's harm best left to the legislature.
84
In 1986, in Smith v. Cote,"'5 the New Hampshire court
refused to acknowledge "a right not to be born,"'18 6 disallowing
compensation to the claimant "from one who has done him no
harm."' 87 Suit was initiated by the mother on behalf of the child
and in her own behalf seeking remuneration from defendant
physicians due to the physicians' negligence in not testing initially
for and detecting, in a timely manner, that the mother had
rubella. Furthermore, the mother was not provided with infor-
mation about the chances of congenital disorders in a fetus
exposed to rubella; therefore, she was unable to make an in-
formed decision as to the procurement of a eugenic abortion.
The mother did not discover that she had been exposed to
rubella, as indicated by the rubella titre test, until she was in
the second trimester of gestation. It was contended that had she
been aware of the dangers associated with exposure to rubella
during pregnancy, she would have exercised her right to an
abortion. The child was born with congenital rubella syn-
drome.'
Some interesting reasons were given by the court in Smith
for declining recognition of this wrongful life action. First, the
child did not suffer an injury by being born, which is an essential
element of the negligence cause of action.8 9 Second, public
policy does not support such a claim, because the right to life
is constitutionally protected under New Hampshire law,19° and
the state should not make decisions as to whether someone's
existence is of value. Additionally, the right to die doctrine
Id. (citing Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812).
SId.
513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986).
Id. at 355.
I' /d.
' Id. at 342-43. The child suffered "bilateral cataracts, multiple congenital heart
defects, motor retardation.... significant hearing impairment... [and] Is]he is legally
blind. .. ." Id. at 342.
' d. at 352.
Id. (citing N.H. CoNsr. pt. I, arts. 1, 2).
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espoused in In re Quinlan'91 does not affect the issue of whether
the child's existence establishes harm within the context of tort
law. 192 Third, public policy is against acknowledgment of the
child's claim that an impaired life is an injury because of the
detrimental effect on the interests of the handicapped in our
society. Current changes in views reflect the public's respect and
appreciation for the abilities, worth, competence and contribu-
tions of the handicapped. 93 Fourth, it is difficult for the courts
to evaluate and decide quality of life questions, because the issue
of harm in a wrongful life action is based on a subjective view
of the importance and worth of one's existence.1
94
As this historical development of the wrongful life case law
illustrates, the overwhelming majority of the courts have rejected
the wrongful life theory. Does this treatment of the issue create
an atmosphere where injustice could easily thrive? Moreover, do
these decisions merely delay the inevitable in an area so impor-
tant in today's society?
III. MIEDICAL ASPECTS
Having identified the problem and considered the legal de-
velopment of the wrongful life tort nationally, this section ad-
dresses the medical aspects of the issue. Here, genetic testing
and counseling, the medical standard of care, the response of
physicians to wrongful life suits, and related matters are empha-
sized.
A. Genetic Testing and Counseling
Genetics has been defined as "[t]he study of heredity and its
variation,"' 95 and a geneticist as "one who specializes in ge-
netics. 1196 Genetic counseling involves "the application of what
is known about human genetics in providing advice to those
who are concerned about the possibility of their offspring being
I Id. (citing 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976)).
192 Id. at 353.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 352-53.
" See MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 148, at 672.
19 Id.
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free of hereditary abnormality.' 1 97 The number of genetically
impaired children born is more significant than most people
believe. As one author stated:
Because most genetic diseases and birth defects are indi-
vidually rare, their cumulative prevalence is not appreciated,
even by physicians. Over 3,000 genetic diseases have been
catalogued. Approximately 5 percent of all newborn infants
suffer from a major or minor malformation, and 60 percent
of these are grossly deforming or life threatening. Approxi-
mately 200,000 deaths per year occur from two common hemo-
globin diseases (sickle cell anemia'98 and thalassemia 99) and
there are an estimated 100 million carriers in the world for
these disorders. The most common genetic disorder among
Caucasians is cystic fibrosis, 2 0 with about 2,000 cases per year
in the United States. Approximately 5 percent of all Americans
are carriers. Among children admitted to pediatric wards of
hospitals, 25 to 30 percent have an underlying genetic disease,
chromosomal disorder, or birth defect. More than half of all
babies born with Down's Syndrome have associated defects,
malformation of the heart, respiratory, gastrointestinal, mus-
culoskeletal, or nervous system.20'
"Until about [the late 1960s], methods of detecting and
predicting human genetic disorders was very inexact. '20 2 The
Id.
Sickle cell anemia is "a hereditary chronic form of anemia in which abnormal
sickle or crescent-shaped erythrocytes are present. Due to the presence of abnormal type
of hemoglobin, hemoglobin S, in red blood cells the frequency of the gene that causes
this disease is high in Mediterranean and African populations." MEricAL DIcTIoNARY,
supra note 148, at 1559.
See infra note 227 for a definition of "thalassemia."
Cystic fibrosis is "a disease of infants, children, adolescents, and young adults
involving the exocrine glands, especially those secreting mucus, and resulting in pancreatic
disease, abnormally high sweat electrolyte levels, and, in some cases, cirrhosis of the
liver." MEDICAL DIcTIONARY, supra note 148, at C-139.
Shaw, supra note 2, at 75-76 (citations omitted).
See Grundtisch, Legal Liability in Genetic Counseling and Testing, 21 A.F. L.
REv. 462, 462 (1979). Although asserting in 1979 that it was medically impossible to
discover most genetic defects in utero, Grundtisch indicated that "amniocentesis and
ultrasonography are the most refined techniques used to detect or predict human genetic
disorders." Id. at 462 n.I. He added that "[a]mniocentesis provides diagnosis of virtually
all known chromosomal abnormalities, certain unborn errors of metabolism and a
majority of 'open' neutral tube defects." Id. (citing Golbus, Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis
in 3000 Amniocenteses, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 157-63 (1979)).
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capacity to accurately predict birth malformations and other
hereditary diseases, however, has improved drastically in recent
years as technology has progressed. 2 3 Genetic counseling likewise
has increased in scope and has been accompanied by augmen-
tation in diagnostic testing and more informed determinations
about whether couples should conceive or continue pregnan-
cies .204
In addition to d physician or other health care provider
informing prospective parents of the probability of their off-
spring being born with genetic diseases, genetic counseling
is a multi-step process in which the genetic counselor attempts
to help the couple to: 1. [c]omprehend the medical facts,
including the diagnosis, probable course of the disorder, and
the available management; 2. appreciate the way heredity con-
tributes to the disorder, and the risk of recurrence in specified
relatives; 3. understand the alternatives for dealing with the
risk of recurrence; 4. choose the course of action which seems
to them appropriate in view of their risk, their family goals,
and their ethical and religious standards, and to act in accord-
ance with that decision; and 5. to make the best possible
adjustment to the disorder in an affected family member and/
or risk of recurrence of that disorder.
20 5
Acceptable and sufficient genetic counseling involves the fulfill-
ment of the five steps outlined above, which requires the coun-
selor to use a reasonable degree of skill and care. Only then can
it be maintained that the couple made an educated decision
regarding the initiation of or the endurance of a pregnancy.
Those genetic advisers who fall short of such reasonable skill
and care in fulfilling their responsibility to their advisees may
201 During the past decade, advances in the antenatal diagnosis of genetic disorders
have proceeded at a revolutionary pace. For instance, amniocentesis and karyotype
analysis of fetal cells have made the detection of Down's syndrome (trisomy 21) and a
host of other chromosomal abnormalities almost routine. In 1979, 28.7% of all pregnant
women in New York age thirty-five or older underwent prenatal cytogenetic studies. See
Hook, Use of Prenatal Cytogenetic Diagnosis in New York State, 305 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1410 (1981); Reilly, supra note 2, at 71.
20 See Grundtisch, supra note 202, at 462.
2 Note, Genetic Counseling and Medical Malpractice: Recognizing a Cause of
Action for Wrongful Life, 8 T. MARsHALL L. Rnv. 154, 156 (1983) (quoting Capron,
Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 CoLTJM. L. Rnv. 618, 621 (1979)).
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be sued and ultimately held liable to their advisees for negligent
conduct. 206
Historically, the event that brought couples to the genetic
counselor was the birth of a child burdened with a genetically
transmitted disease. Only recently have more couples sought
advice to pinpoint the odds of their parenting such a child.
Genetic advisers are being sought out in greater numbers partly
because the new prenatal diagnosis technology has armed them
with a greater ability to read the genetic crystal balls of those con-
cerned couples.20 7
Amniocentesis, fetoscopy, and ultrasound head the list as
the most widely recognized prenatal examinations. 2° Amniocen-
tesis involves a small quantity of amniotic fluid extracted from
the uterus of the mother-to-be. A hypodermic needle directed
by ultrasound removes the fluid which contains cells discarded
by the fetus. Biochemical and chromosomal defects capable of
retarding, seriously harming, or otherwise threatening the sur-
vival of a fetus can be detected through examination of the
amniotic fluid cells.2°9 Genetic diseases are determined by ex-
amining the amniotic fluid and developing it in a culture me-
dium. If the testing indicates a fetus affected with a hereditary
ailment, abortion becomes an option.210 Approximately sixty
genetic disorders could be accurately detected through amni-
ocentesis, and, of course, that number is increasing rapidly with
new technology. 21'
:", See Note, supra note 205, at 156-57; See also Note, Father and Mother Know
Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE
L.J. 1488, 1504 (1978) (author argues tort liability should be imposed on negligent
physicians to reduce the incidence of genetic defects, but that only claims by parents should
be sustained) [hereinafter Note, Father and Mother Know Best].
)' See Note, supra note 205, at 157 (citing Note, Father and Mother Know Best,
supra note 206, at 1492). See also Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical
Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REv. 713, 720 (1982).
: See Note, supra note 205, at 157. For more information on fetoscopy and
ultrasound, see Note, Father and Mother Know Best, supra note 206.
:: See Altman, Birth-Defect Suits Worry Doctors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1979,
(Science Times), at C2. See also Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 92, 95, 97 (1974); Note, supra note 205, at 157. See generally BEHnRu.AN's,
supra note 73, at 1028-33.
2"I See Friedman, supra note 209, at 95, 98-99; Note, supra note 205, at 157.
21 See Altman, supra note 209, at C2. See generally BEma.AN 's, supra note 73, at
1028-33.
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The National Genetics Foundation reported in 1979 that
known genetic diseases exceeded 2,000.212 A more recent source
indicates that scientists "are focusing on discovering which genes
cause each of the nearly 4,000 hereditary disorders.' '213 It is not
surprising that, as of 1979, one-third of patients admitted to
pediatric medical centers suffered from some type of genetic
disorder.
214
Medical geneticists utilize an assortment of tools to estimate
the chances that a given couple will parent a child marked by a
particular disorder. First, the geneticist reviews old medical rec-
ords and takes comprehensive medical histories of both parents
and their blood relatives. Finally, a battery of tests is completed
and counseling based on the total picture follows. The gains
made in early pregnancy testing are of particular importance in
recent years. Hereditary conditions detected in the early months
of gestation allow abortions to be performed without danger, if
that is the alternative chosen.215 Other tests performed simulta-
neously with amniocentesis can alert the geneticist to many chro-
mosomal abnormalities such as Down's syndrome.
21 6
The success of such procedures as amniocentesis has made
many women feel more secure that their children will not be
born with genetic disorders. Many physicians publicly express
concern that the reported successes of amniocentesis have created
a false sense of safety about the procedure itself. There have
been isolated instances of needle damage to the fetus, miscar-
212 Altman, supra note 209, at C2. See generally BEmuAAN's, supra note 73, at
1013-34.
213 Shaffer, Advances in Genetics Improve Diagnosis of Inherited Disease, WAL
ST. J., Nov. 4, 1983, § 2 (Technology), at 37. See generally BEmU AN's, supra note 73,
at 1013-34.
214 See Altman, supra note 209, at C2. See generally BamueA's, supra note 73, at
1013-34.
"I Altman, supra note 209, at C2. See generally BEmAN's, supra note 73, at
1033.
216 Down's syndrome is the "preferred term for mongolism, a variety of congenital
moderate-to-severe mental retardation. Marked by sloping forehead, small ear canals,
presence of epicanthal folds causing an Oriental appearance of eyes, gray or very light
yellow spots at periphery of iris (Brushfield's spots), short broad hand with a single
palmar crease (simian crease), a flat nose or absent bridge, low-set ears, and generally
dwarfed physique." MEDicAL DICTiONARY, supra note 148, at 490. See also Altman,
supra note 209, at C2. See generally BEamAN's, supra note 73, at 1028-33.
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riages, and bleeding. Rulings like Becker2 7 may jeopardize the
careers of physicians due to current doubt over the suggested
age for amniocentesis testing and the attendant danger of the
procedure. 2 -
Medical practitioners possessing the capability and profi-
ciency necessary to handle problems involving genetically trans-
mitted diseases in humans are unfortunately scarce. 219
[O]nly a handful of our clinicians have the ability to completely
deal with human genetic-related matters. Prospective parents
commonly ask for details of the clinical manifestations or the
complications of a disease state, and the ability to deal with
these questions with confidence and competence is usually
beyond the scope of those who have no special knowledge or
who have acquired what they know from reading textbooks
and periodicals.20°
To gather and analyze data properly, the practitioner must
possess special, superior skills for such an intensely dangerous
practice. Nongeneticists have not yet developed expertise or ca-
pability in this area, and to assume otherwise would be disas-
trous. Not only must the genetic adviser possess a high degree
of understanding gained through experience and study, but a
continuing cognizance of modern techniques and technology is
imperative.Y
There are some conditions and circumstances that are appro-
priate for referring a couple to a medical geneticist. They in-
clude:
"1 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Becker.
11 See Altman, supra note 209, at C2. It states:
One of the most publicized of these defects is Down's Syndrome [sic]. The
risk of bearing a Down's Syndrome [sic] child rises sharply at about age
40. The risk under age 30 is one in 1,500, according to the United States
Public Health Service, rising to one in 280 between the ages of 35 and 39
and to one in 130 between 40 and 44. Beyond the age of 45, the Federal
statistics put the risk at one in 65.
Id. A more recent source reveals that "at the age of 30, a woman's chances of giving
birth to a Down's syndrome child are about one in 885; at 35, they increase to one in
365; and at 40, they're about one in 109." Rapp, Who Should Consider Amniocentesis?,
Ms., Apr. 1984, at 98. See generally BEMMAN'S, supra note 73, at 1028-33.
See Grundtisch, supra note 202, at 470-71.
- Id.
Id. at 471.
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1. Known or presumed congenital abnormalities.
a. Congenital malformations of any type.
b. Ambiguous genitalia, hemaphroditism.
c. Mental retardation (cause unknown).
d. Fetal or parental exposure to environmental agents
(drugs, irradiation, infections, and maternal factors).
2. Acknowledged familiar disorders.
3. Known inherited disorders.
4. Metabolic, biochemical disorders (screening).
5. Known or suspected chromosome abnormalities.
6. Multiple miscarriages, still births.
7. Infertility.
8. Premarital counseling.
9. Consanguinity, incest.
10. Prenatal diagnosis.
222
a. Either parent a known "balanced carrier" for a chro-
mosome abnormality.
b. Previous child with any kind of chromosome abnor-
mality.
c. Mother 35 or older.
d. Inordinate parental concern or anxiety.
e. Both parents carriers for a specifically diagnosable
metabolic or structural autosomal recessive disorder.
f. Either parents affected with a specifically diagnosable
metabolic or structural dominant disorder.
g. Mother a known or presumed carrier for a serious x-
linked recessive disorder.
h. Either parent having a first- or second-degree relative
with a neural tube defect (e.g., spine bifida, anencephaly),Y2
Although all diseases are not discoverable through prenatal diagnosis, it can
detect disorders such as:
dominant gene conditions that a parent has, like one very serious high
cholesterol predisposition to heart disease; recessive gene conditions in
which parents are carriers but never manifest the problem themselves, such
as Cooley's anemia found in Mediterranean peoples, Tay-Sachs among Ash-
keazi Jews, and sickle-cell anemia-in people of African descent; neural
tube defects such as anencephaly (a missing portion of the brain) and spina
bifida (caused by a prenatal lesion in the neural tube); [and] chromosomal
anomalies in which the "wrong number" of chromosomes cause conditions
like Turner's and Klinefelter's syndromes, and, most commonly, Down's
syndrome.
See Rapp, supra note 218. See generally BeamniN's, supra note 73, at 1028-33.
n' Grundtisch, supra note 202, at 471-72 (citing V. RiccARDI, THE GENETIc AP-
PROACH T o HumAN DisEAsE 6 (1977)).
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Although discovery of hereditary disorders has been ex-
panded considerably in recent years, actual medical care and
treatment of such disorders have not enjoyed similar success,
and the hope for immediate advances is not as optimistic. The
growth of diagnostic testing is so rapid that systematic exami-
nation of every mother-to-be for the presence of the most prev-
alent genetic disorders seems quite practical in the near future.
Most of these tests provide accurate data when performed on
the fetus, the minor, or the adult of either sex. The possibilities
seem endless, and the day may arrive when even the probability
of a child contracting a disease sometime later in life is a
projectable factor. 224
"In one prenatal test, copies of defective genes are helping
doctors to detect thalassemia without drawing a blood sample
from the unborn child, which kills about 5% of the babies
tested. ' 2 s As early as the eighth week of gestation, another
encouraging test, chorionic villi biopsy, detbcts certain genetic
defects in fetuses. Today's most widely utilized test, the amni-
ocentesis, generally is performed in the sixteenth week. The
earlier test, however, brings hope for safer and less emotionally
draining abortions.
226
In the new eighth-week test "a thin plastic tube is put into
the uterus through the vagina. The tube sucks out a few of the
fingerlike tissues that holds the fetus to the womb .... Genes
in the tissue can be analyzed in a few hours, as opposed to the
weeks required for the same analysis of the fluid sample in
amniocentesis." 227 "Because the sample is obtained through the
mouth of the womb, the biopsy may also be less risky than
amniocentesis to the mother and child."' ' Because it is nonin-
1-1 See Shaffer, supra note 213, at 37. See generally BEHRMAN's, supra note 73, at
1028-33.
12 Shaffer, supra note 213, at 27. Thalassemia is "[a] group of hereditary anemias
... produced by either a defective productive rate of the alpha or beta hemoglobin
polypeptide chain or a deceased synthesis of the beta chain." MEDICAL DIcToNARY,
supra note 148, at 1716. See also BEHEMAN'S, supra note 73, at 732-33.
121 See Shaffer, supra note 213, at 37. See generally BEHRMAN's, supra note 73, at
1033.
"' Shaffer, supra note 213, at 37.
12 Id. Primarily for the purpose of determining fetal sex, physicians in China,
Europe, and the Soviet Union have been working with the biopsy procedure for years.
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vasive and provides an opportunity for selective abortion prior
to the time when the mother has experienced fetal motion and
abdomen expansion, many predict that chorionic villi biopsy will
gradually supersede amniocentesis as the preferred method of
diagnosing genetic abnormalities within the next few years. 29
Exactly how much risk chorionic villi biopsy presents to both
mother and child is uncertain. While the preliminary success has
been most encouraging, the next two or three years of research
and practice will tell a more complete story. The prospect of
informing parents of a defect at a point at which alternatives
are really alternatives inspires many physicians and others in the
medical community.2 0 Once the chorionic villi biopsy's safety
and effectiveness have been certified to the satisfaction of the
medical community, it is then arguable that every prospective
mother can be screened or at least be given that option, because
there is no augmented danger to the mother or her un-born
child. 231
Using chorionic biopsy, scientists in France are able to diagnose sickle cell anemia about
two months subsequent to conception. Biopsy patients in the United States have been
accepted on a trial basis for testing chorionic biopsy procedures by Chicago's Michael
Reese Medical Center, Philadelphia's Thomas Jefferson Medical Center, and Yale Med-
ical School. Id. See also Shaw, supra note 2, at 76-77 (discussion of advantages of
chorionic villi biopsy).
Chorionic biopsy involves the chorion "[a]n extraembyronic membrane that, in
early development, forms the outer wall of the blastocyst. It is formed from the
trophoblast and its inner lining of mesoderm. From it develop chorionic villi which
establish an intimate connection with the endometrium, giving rise to the placenta."
MEDICAL DICTioNARY, supra note 148, at 324. See generally BEmMAN's, supra note 73,
at 1028-33.
2 See Shaw, supra note 2, at 76. See generally Cowart, First-Trimester Prenatal
Diagnostic Method Becoming Available in U.S., 250 J. A.M.A. 1249 (1983); Kazy,
Rozovsky & Bakharev, Chorion Biopsy in Early Pregnancy: A Method of Early Prenatal
Diagnosis for Inherited Disorders, 2 PRENATAL DIAG. 39 (1982).
I" See Shaffer, supra note 213, at 37. See generally BEmUAN's, supra note 73, at
1033.
"' See Shaw, supra note 2, at 77. Another recent advance in medical genetics being
explored widely and applied in selected cases for prenatal diagnosis is restriction fragment
length polymorphisms. Id. at 77-78. See generally Botstein, White, Skolnick & Davis,
Construction of a Genetic Linkage Map in Man Using Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphisms, 32 AM. J. Hum. GENET. 314 (1980) (description of new basis for
constructing genetic linkage map of human genome using restrictive fragment length
,polymorphisms); Skolnick & White, Strategies for Detecting and Characterizing Restric-
tion Fragment Length Polymorphisms (RFLPS), 32 CYTOGENETIC CELL GENET. 58 (1982).
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The proliferation of wrongful life suits would seem to indi-
cate that genetic diseases, chromosome related malformations,
congenital defects, and others like them could be reduced greatly
by prenatal diagnosis, genetic counseling, and selective abor-
tions.
B. The Medical Standard of Care
Progress in the genetics discipline and its tools of
amniocentesis232 and ultrasonography23 have enabled physicians
to accurately predict fetal defects. As parents begin to rely more
and more on genetic information, it seems likely, if not inevi-
table, that diagnostic errors will pave the way for additional tort
litigation.23 4 As litigation increases, it seems that innovative and
different theories of recovery will likely also appear. 235
Using new diagnostic techniques is a must for all physicians
to satisfy their professional duty to their patients. They are
"bound to keep abreast of the times. 2 36 To define the standard
as the duty to keep "abreast of the times" is simply too vague,
especially considering the tremendous growth of medical knowl-
edge in the last twenty years .237 In reality, the actual relationship
between a physician and his standard of practice is considerably
more sophisticated and difficult to pin down.
For physicians, the recognized standard (called the locality
rule) has been "the standard of professional competence and
care customary in [the same or] similar communities among
2"' For an explanation of the amniocentesis procedure, see supra text accompanying
note 209-11.
"I Ultrasonography is the "[ulse of ultrasound to produce an image or photograph
of an organ or tissue. Ultrasonic echoes are recorded as they strike tissues of different
densities." MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 148, at 1799.
1" According to statistics gathered between 1973 and 1980 by the St. Paul Com-
panies, the nation's largest medical malpractice insurer, failure to properly diagnose was
alleged in 25076 of the medical malpractice cases filed. Statistics for suits between July
and October of 1976 gathered by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
show that 250 of all claims filed and 5007o of claims filed against internists and general
practitioners involved diagnostic errors. For nonsurgical cases, claims involving insuffi-
cient testing were the highest in number. See Furrow, supra note 9, at 12.
Id.
2 Id.
I' d.
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physicians engaged in [their] field of practice." 238 An increasing
number of courts have ruled that there is a minimum national
standard, especially where the physician defendant is a special-
ist.239 Thus, a higher standard of care may be imposed on the
specialist.24
Concerning physicians' standard of care, one writer has sug-
gested a physician may be classified as: the out-of-touch prac-
titioner; the reluctant practitioner; the faithful follower; and the
innovative physician. 241 The out-of-touch practitioners have not
espoused, for a myriad of reasons, the prevailing trends con-
cerning the standard of care or of diagnostic testing. For in-
stance, a physician is not liable for a fallacious assessment of a
patient's condition due to a miscalculation in judgment caused
by the physician's failure to embrace the prevailing trend of
diagnostic testing. 242 When pertinent data is not obtained by
utilizing typical tests, however, the physician more likely will be
held negligent. 243 One court has stated:
If a physician, as an aid to diagnosis, i.e., his judgment, does
not avail himself of the scientific means and facilities open to
him for the collection of the best factual data upon which to
arrive at his diagnosis, the result is not an error of judgment
but negligence in failing to secure an adequate factual basis
upon which to support his diagnosis or judgment. 2A
Proverbial malpractice is found where the physician neglects to
acknowledge an ever-changing standard of medical practice. If
adequate evidence is offered and deviation from a standard of
care is shown, victory for the plaintiff is probable. Physicians
who neglect to at least mention the possibility of an amniocen-
28 Health v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526, 529 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (citing
Dickens v. Everhart, 199 S.E.2d 440, 443 (N.C. 1973)).
13 See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
196 (7th ed. 1982). See also Murphy v. Little, 145 S.E.2d 760 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965)
(negligence in placing cast on fractured arm); Roberts v. Tardif, 417 A.2d 444 (Me.
1980) (negligence in delivery of baby); WVentling v. Jenny, 293 N.W.2d 76 (Neb. 1980)
(negligence in failing to timely diagnose and treat breast cancer).
m See 252 S.E.2d at 529 (1979).
241 See Furrow, supra note 9, at 12-14.
2,1 See id. at 13, 47 n.23 (citing Peterson v. Hunt, 84 P.2d 999 (Wash. 1938)).
24 See id. at 13.
z" Id. (quoting Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir. 1968)).
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tesis to a thirty-five-and-over mother-to-be had better check their
malpractice premium receipts if impaired children result from
their omissions .245
The reluctant practitioners represent the physicians who are
unwilling to embrace the relevant medical standard. For instance,
this practitioner does not employ or advise the application of
fetal monitors during childbirth even though this monitoring is
customary in the profession. This departure from established
procedures, pursuant to conventional professional negligence
principles, can lead to legal responsibility unless the jury is
convinced that fetal monitoring is not a standard procedure
within the medical profession.
246
Medical practitioners in this posture contest conformance
with conventional practice by asserting that their refusal to em-
ploy such measures as fetal monitoring or amniocentesis testing
is reasonable. They argue that "as a statistical matter [these
tests] cause greater harm to all patients even though such meas-
ures would actually have been helpful (a fact not predictable by
the defendant) in the particular case before the jury.
' 247
Reluctant practitioners also might help their cases by intro-
ducing data to illustrate that the prudence of using such a
technique is not absolute when considered against the frequency
and resulting expense of Caesarean sections. These physicians
might assert application of the "best judgment" rule, in support
of their actions or inactions, contending, "a physician should
use his or her own best judgment when the commonplace medical
practice is dangerous." This standard seems to present an
insurmountable obstacle for the defendant physician and sug-
gests that failure to conform his or her conduct to the applicable
standard of care is difficult to explain and virtually impossible
to defend.
249
The faithful followers are the practitioners who, with the
spiritual conviction of saints, embrace every medical procedure
245 See id. See also Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309 (D.S.C. 1983);
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
"' See Furrow, supra note 9, at 13.
147 Id. at 47 n.26.
2 Id. at 13.
z Id.
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that exemplifies the prevailing current or direction of the medical
profession. Generally, these practitioners adhere to acceptable
practice and are logical in their convictions that others have laid
the research groundwork necessary to support and certify the
current medical procedure. Such a trusting adherence to new
technology may get faithful followers in trouble in certain situ-
ations. The mainstream procedure possibly may have been
adopted too quickly by the profession. Also, recent scientific
investigation may result in the introduction of improvements not
snagged by the mainstream practice. Finally, especially with
respect to discovery of the nature of a patient's illness, main-
stream procedures may result in such heavy dependence by prac-
titioners on current technology that they abandon other more
conventional and effective diagnostic checks and balances. 0 For
example, faulty laboratory tests may go undetected as in Cur-
lender v. Bio Science LaboratoriesY1
The fourth classification includes the innovative physicians
who have been so labeled because they are delighted by new
diagnostic tools that have not yet been adopted by the main-
stream. If the procedure has garnered insignificant support in
medical periodicals and in medical circles and, provided it does
not function accurately or predictably, these physicians may find
themselves liable for malpractice. Such physicians may not even
be protected through complete disclosure of the experimental
nature of the procedure to their patients because for social policy
reasons, complete disclosure is not a shield to legal responsibility
for such innovation.
252
The proliferation of medical research, technology, and data
have helped to create wrongful life actions. The need for every
doctor to be cognizant of new medical procedures, publication
materials on current technology, and the effect on the prevailing
standard of professional care are brought ever so close to home
via these suits.
253
= Id.
2' 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). See supra notes 79-90 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Curlender.
212 See Furrow, supra note 9, at 14.
23 See id.
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Physicians should be aware of the cause of birth defects
because in some cases the defects are under the control of
physicians. This control imposes a duty to protect the fetus when
possible.2 14 Some of the causes of birth defects are environmental
teratogens2 s and embryotoxins, 2 6 which include maternal infec-
tions such as: rubella (German measles); syphilis, herpes, gon-
norrhea and autoimmune deficiency syndrome (AIDS); other
maternal illnesses such as thyroid disease, ovarian and adrenal
gland tumors, hypertension, fever, diabetes and vaginal bleeding;
environmental chemicals; occupational hazards; and some pre-
scription drugs .217
C. Response of Physicians to Wrongful Life Suits
Only a limited number of claimants have experienced success
in wrongful life litigation against physicians and other health
maintenance providers and centers .2  Nonetheless, many doctors
are very concerned, due to court awards to children with con-
genital disorders. The fact that many courts have permitted
monetary compensation for wrongful birth to parents of im-
paired infants219 also increases physicians' anxiety. Geneticists
and consumer organizations praised the Becker decision of the
New York court which held doctors legally obligated to claimants
for lifetime protection, supervision, and attentiveness to the
needs of their children born with hereditary or birth disorders.
260
Obviously, the decision was not well received in the medical
community, with obstetricians particularly troubled.
2 61
Proponents of consumer rights viewed the New York court's
ruling as an avenue for patients to become involved in the
z° See Shaw, supra note 2, at 66.
k'" Id. at 67. Teratogen "is an agent that causes birth defects. Many substances
that produce genetic mutations (mutagens) and cancer (carcinogens) are also terato-
genic." Id. at 67 n.18.
-" Id. Embryotoxin "interferes with embryonic development and sometimes causes
death (spontaneous abortion and stillbirth). It can also lead to premature births and low
birthweight infants." Id. at 67 n.19.
": See id. at 67-73 (additional information regarding causes of birth defects).
See supra notes 91, 101, 120 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 for courts that have recognized wrongful birth actions.
386 N.E.2d 807; Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
See Altman, supra note 209, at Cl. See generally BEmHMAN'S, supra note 73, at
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resolution of issues that have a lasting effect on themselves and
their families. Some specialists projected the decision would
cause a decrease in births of impaired children. Many practi-
tioners asserted, however, that the decision would simply in-
crease the number of diagnostic tests ordered for mothers-to-be
and aggravate already spiriling malpractice insurance premiums,
boost medical expenses, and actually result in the increase in
abortions of healthy embryos and fetuses.
262
Obstetricians feel that public discussion of amniocentesis
testing has tended to deemphasize the test's risks. There is danger
that the needle used can harm the fetus or cause miscarriages or
bleeding. Physicians feel they have been placed in a precarious
situation because of uncertainty over the age at which amni-
ocentesis is recommended and the hazards involved.2 63
An obstetrician compared the situation generated by the
court compensating parents of impaired children to the contro-
versy involving D.E.S., 264 a medication designed to decrease
miscarriages. Recently, it has been determined that D.E.S. has
a carcinogenic effect on certain females born to mothers who
took the medication. This obstetrician believed that the medical
community viewed the Becker decision as the flame leading to
doctors "getting burned again," provided some technique now
considered safe is ultimately determined to have unanticipated
complications .265
Practitioners also wonder how far to go in counseling cou-
ples. It has been suggested that some obstetricians are attempting
to insulate themselves by telling every mother-to-be that she has
a two percent risk of giving birth to an impaired child. Critics
of plaintiff malpractice recoveries predictably assert that holding
Altman, supra note 209, at Cl. See generally BERAN's, supra note 73, at
1028-33.
23 Altman, supra note 209, at C2. See generally BEmam"N's, supra note 73, at
1028-33.
24 D.E.S. is a synthetic estrogen drug called diethylstilbestrol which was used to
prevent miscarriages. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (market share liability imposed against all D.E.S. manufac-
turers except those demonstrating they could not have made the product causing injury).
126 See Altman, supra note 209, at C2. See generally BEmuLAN'S, supra note 73, at
1028-33.
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doctors liable for all defects unacceptably increases professional
negligence insurance costs.
266
In his dissenting opinion in Becker,267 Judge Wachtler ac-
knowledged the physician's dilemma, projecting that other costs
are inevitable, which may be even more difficult to measure.
Some doctors may even be inclined to propose abortion in their
attempt to practice "defensive medicine." Certainly, a physician
faced with liability and malpractice premiums of such propor-
tions might so advise parents rather than take the chance of
compensating a claimant for lifetime care. In Judge Wachtler's
view, such abortion decisions involve human costs as well. What
price tag can one attach to the unnecessary abortion of a healthy
child? Even if it is the threat of pecuniary liability that motivates,
what price the human life?
26s
CONCLUSION
The wrongful life issue has posed difficult questions for
courts and has imposed additional duties on physicians and other
health care providers. Malfeasance and nonfeasance, such as
misdiagnosis of a previous child, laboratory errors, misdiagnosis
of pregnancy, failure to identify high risk parents, failure to
take a family history, failure to perform diagnostic tests, failure
to provide genetic counseling, 269 and failure to inform the parents
of the availability of amniocentesis testing have resulted in
wrongful life actions. Although a number of lawsuits have al-
leged one or more of these negligent acts, most courts have
refused to recognize children's wrongful life claims that they
should never have been born.
Courts have given several reasons for their refusal to recog-
nize wrongful life actions, and the same arguments appear re-
peatedly. First, courts have said the plaintiffs deny their own
standing to sue by asserting they should never have been born.
Second, damages are not calculable because of the impossibility
- Altman, supra note 209, at Cl.
- See 386 N.E.2d at 816 (Wachtler, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 818-19.
See Shaw, To be or Not to be? That is the Question, 36 A. J. Hum. GENET.
1, 6 (1984).
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of comparing nonexistence with an impaired existence. Third,
the plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury be-
cause life, even if severely defective, is more precious than
nonexistence. Fourth, the mother's physician owes no duty to
the fetus. Fifth, the judiciary is unable to evaluate metaphysical,
theological, or philosophical issues. Sixth, there is no legal right
not to be born. Seventh, the physician's wrongful act did not
cause the defect. Eighth, the court recognizes that the sanctity
of life outweighs the quality of life. Ninth, there is no funda-
mental right to be born as a whole, functional human being.
Tenth, the social impact of recognition of wrongful life actions
could be staggering because it would open the floodgates to all
kinds of frivolous claims by persons who are dissatisfied with
life. Eleventh, recognition of these actions against health care
providers would lead to wrongful life actions against parents.
Twelfth, recognition of wrongful life claims is against public
policy and is a matter to be resolved by the legislature.
Although the preceding arguments have been made to justify
the denial of wrongful life actions, some courts have recognized
the action, a trend this Author believes to be in the right direc-
tion. Recovery, however, has been limited to special damages
for extraordinary expenses, such as medical care and special
training. These courts feel that the child has suffered a legally
cognizable injury. General damages, however, were not awarded
because pain and suffering and emotional distress are not readily
calculable versus nonexistence, being beyond the capacity of
human imagination.
This Author is not convinced that such comparisons cannot
be made. Comparisons of existence and nonexistence occur fre-
quently in situations in which patients would expire unless they
receive medical life support and in cases in which a vegetative
patient's life might be prolonged, but life support treatment is
withheld or discontinued. 270 In the case involving a vegetative,
comatose patient or a terminally-ill person, prolonging the in-
dividual's life is presumed more harmful than allowing the per-
270 See, e.g., In the Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (life support
system permitted to be terminated when individual's right to privacy overcame state's
interest in preserving life, due to increased degree of bodily invasion accompanied by
dimness of prognosis).
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son to die and that the latter is in the patient's best interests.
The decision to cease prolonging a person's life appears based
on a comparison between the harm of existence in an impaired
state and the harm of nonexistence.27 ' If this inference is correct
it should not be impossible for the courts to compare and place
a value on existence and nonexistence in a wrongful life case.
Thus, a major reason for failure to recognize wrongful life
actions should not focus on the issue of existence versus nonex-
istence, but perhaps whether being alive is something for which
one should be compensated. Medical, educational, rehabilitation,
and other costs associated with a physically impaired child can-
not overshadow the joys of life. The joys of life are emotional
in nature; but joy, however great, cannot speak to the plaintiff
child's financial condition.
"I See Jones & Perry, Can Claims for 'Wrongful life' be Justified?, 9 J. MED.
ETHICS 162, 164 (1983).
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